der erste Biograf Hegels, Karl Rosenkranz, schreibt: Hegel ist der Philosoph der Revolution und nicht der Philosoph der Restauration“, so Klaus. Georg Friedrich Hegel zählt bis heute zu den einflussreichsten Denkern der Philosophie. Heute wäre er Jahre alt geworden. Er bleibt. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel ( - ) gilt als einer der meist gehassten und doch einer der einflussreisten Philosophen Deutschlands. Ist sein Denken.
Hegel, der Weltgeist und die FreiheitWoran soll man sich als Philosoph festhalten? G. W. F. Hegel auf einer Lithografie von Julius Ludwig Sebbers - mit einer kleinen, nahrhaften. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel war ein deutscher Philosoph, der als wichtigster Vertreter des deutschen Idealismus gilt. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel ( - ) gilt als einer der meist gehassten und doch einer der einflussreisten Philosophen Deutschlands. Ist sein Denken.
Philosophe Hegel Navigation menu VideoHegel - Reconnaissance et philosophie du droit (France culture)
Serien stream legal Club Der Toten Dichter Netflix, kehrt Ben fr kurze Zeit nach Essen zurck. - Tübingen: Stadt der Dichter und DenkerDiese beiden Willen können in einem Gegensatz Charmed Neuauflage stehen, was einen Bruch des Rechts zur Folge hat. Le Capital. Oxford: Oxford University Press. The text Walking Dead Spiel starts from the conception of a singular willing Sophie Briest grasped Ps4 Themes the point of view of its individual self-consciousness as the bearer of abstract right. Afterlife Euthyphro dilemma Faith Intelligent design Miracle Problem of evil Religious belief Soul Spirit Theodicy Theological veto. Williams, Robert R. Luther, Timothy C. See also: Porphyrian tree. Rather than wanting to eliminate metaphysics, after the style, say, of Hume or the modern logical positivists, Kant had Charlyne Yi to put metaphysics itself on a secure scientific basis analogous Sydney White – Campus Queen Besetzung what Galileo and Newton had achieved for physics. Fraser, F. Pinkard, Terry,Does History Make Sense? Abstract object Anima mundi Being Category of being Causality Causal closure Choice Cogito, ergo sum Concept Embodied cognition Essence Existence Experience Hypostatic abstraction Idea Identity Information Insight Intelligence Intention Linguistic modality Matter Meaning Memetics Mental representation Kung Fu Filme Deutsch Motion Nature Necessity Notion Object Pattern Perception Physical object Principle Property Qualia Quality Reality Relation Soul Subject Substantial form Thought Time Truth Type—token distinction Universal Unobservable Value more It is in Philosophe Hegel course of Chapter 4 that we find what is perhaps the most well-known Sturm Der Liebe Folge 3365 of the Phenomenologythe account of the struggle of recognition in which Hegel examines the inter-subjective conditions which he sees as necessary for any form of consciousness. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, —.
Some have argued that Hegel's vision of the state as an organic rational whole, leaves no room for individual dissent and choice, no room for the very freedom he was advocating.
However, it should be noted that Hegel's idea of freedom was quite different from what we think of as the traditional Liberal conception of freedom which he would have seen as merely the ability to follow your own caprice , and rather consists in the fulfillment of oneself as a rational individual.
He did not expound in any detail, though, on his vision of the ideal state , and how such a state might avoid sinking into authoritarianism and Totalitarianism.
Hegel categorically rejected Kant 's "thing-in-itself" and his noumenal world , arguing against Kant 's claim that something that exists was unknowable as contradictory and inconsistent.
On the contrary, he claimed that whatever is must by definition be knowable : "The real is rational, and the rational is real". He asserted that what becomes the real is "Geist" which, as we have noted above, can be translated as mind, spirit or soul , which he also sees as developing through history , with each period having a "Zeitgeist" spirit of the age.
Thus, although individuals and whole societies change as part of the dialectical process, what is really changing is the underlying Geist.
He also held that each person's individual consciousness or mind is really part of the Absolute Mind even if the individual does not realize this , and he argued that if we understood that we were part of a greater consciousness we would not be so concerned with our individual freedom , and we would agree to act rationally in a way that did not follow our individual caprice, thereby achieving self-fulfillment.
There has been much debate about whether Hegel's philosophy should be considered religious or spiritual or not. Most have interpreted his idea of an Absolute Mind as essentially a kind of Monism , which may or may not involve a monotheistic God of the traditional Christian kind.
Some have seen it as closer to a kind of Pantheism. However, most of his philosophy also makes good sense when interpreted in a non-religious way, concerned merely with human minds.
Hegel also discussed the concept of alienation in his work, the idea of something that is part of us and within us and yet seems in some way foreign or alien or hostile.
He introduced the figure of the "unhappy soul" , who prays to a God whom he believes to be all-powerful, all-knowing and all-good, and who sees himself in contrast as powerless, ignorant and base.
Hegel submits that this is wrong because we are effectively part of God or Geist or Mind , and thus possessed of all good qualities as well as bad.
Hegel's thought is often considered the summit of early 19th Century German Idealism. Hegel was deeply disturbed by the riots for reform in Berlin in that year.
In , Frederick William III decorated him with the Order of the Red Eagle , 3rd Class for his service to the Prussian state.
Now in a weak state of health, Hegel seldom went out. As the new semester began in October, Hegel returned to Berlin in the mistaken belief that the epidemic had largely subsided.
By 14 November, Hegel was dead. The physicians pronounced the cause of death as cholera, but it is likely he died from another gastrointestinal disease.
In accordance with his wishes, Hegel was buried in the Dorotheenstadt cemetery next to Fichte and Karl Wilhelm Ferdinand Solger. Hegel's illegitimate son, Ludwig Fischer, had died shortly before while serving with the Dutch army in Batavia and the news of his death never reached his father.
From the time of Leibniz to the widespread adoption of Frege 's logic in the s, every standard work on logic consisted of three divisions: doctrines of concept, judgment, and inference.
Doctrines of concept address the systematic, hierarchical relations of the most general classes of things. Doctrines of judgment investigate relations of subject and predicate ; and doctrines of inference lay out the forms of syllogisms originally found in Aristotelian term logic.
Indeed, "logic" in the field of nineteenth-century continental philosophy takes on a range of meanings from "metaphysics" to "theory of science," from "critical epistemology" to "first philosophy.
Each new logic book staked a new claim in a century-long expansionist turf war among philosophical trends. With the possible exception of the study of inference, what was called "logic" in nineteenth-century Europe and so Hegel's Logic bears little resemblance to what logicians study today.
Logic, particularly the doctrine of the concept, was metaphysics; it was the search for a fundamental ontological structure within the relations of the most basic predicates quantity, time, place etc.
This research program took on new meaning with the publication of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Kant derived his own table of categories the twelve pure or "ancestral" concepts of the understanding that structure all experience irrespective of content from a standard term-logical table of judgments, noting also that.
The Science of Logic which the later Hegel considered central to his philosophy can be considered a notable contribution to the research program of category metaphysics in its post-Kantian form, taking up the project that Kant suggested is necessary but did not himself pursue: "to take note of and, as far as possible, completely catalog" the derivative concepts of the pure understanding and "completely illustrate its family tree.
The affinity between Hegel and Kant's logics "speculative" and "transcendental" respectively is apparent in their vocabulary.
Kant spoke of Entstehen coming-to-be and Vergehen ceasing-to-be , the same two terms that Hegel used to refer to the two compositional elements of Werden becoming.
Kant used the term Veränderung change instead of Werden , however, and the designation of ontological categories by name is itself a complex topic.
And although the Logic 's table of contents minimally resembles Kant's table of categories, the four headings of Kant's table quantity, quality, relation, and modality do not play, in Hegel's dialectic, the organizational role that Kant had in mind for them, and Hegel ultimately faulted Kant for copying the table of judgments from the "modern compendiums of logic" whose subject matter is, Hegel said, in need of "total reconstruction.
Because every concept is a composite of contraries value is black and white, temperature is hot and cold, etc. For this reason, Hegel's Logic begins with the summum genus , "Being, pure Being," "and God has the absolutely undisputed right that the beginning be made with him"  from which are derived more concrete concepts such as becoming, determinate being, something, and infinity.
The precise nature of the procedural self-concretization that drives Hegel's Logic is still the subject of controversy.
Scholars such as Clark Butler hold that a good portion of the Logic is formalizable, proceeding deductively via indirect proof.
As the logical Idea is seen to unfold itself in a process from the abstract to the concrete, so in the history of philosophy the earliest systems are the most abstract, and thus at the same time the poorest Hegel's categories are, in part, carried over from his Lectures on the History of Philosophy.
For example: Parmenides took pure being to be the absolute; Gorgias replaced it with pure nothing; Heraclitus replaced both being and nothing with becoming which is a unity of two contraries: coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be.
That history should resemble this dialectic indicated to Hegel that history is something rational. For both Hegel and Kant, "we arrive at the concept of the thing in itself by removing, or abstracting from, everything in our experiences of objects of which we can become conscious.
If we abstract 'Ding' [ thing ] from 'Ding an sich' [ thing in itself ], we get one of Hegel's standard phrases: 'an sich. A child, in Hegel's example, is thus 'in itself' the adult it will become: to know what a 'child' is means to know that it is, in some respects, a vacancy which will only gain content after it has grown out of childhood.
The "thing as it is in itself" is indeed knowable: it is the indeterminate, "futural" aspect of the thing we experience—it is what we will come to know.
In other words, although the thing-in-itself is at any given moment thoroughly unknown, it nevertheless remains that part of the thing about which it is possible to learn more.
Karen Ng writes that "there is a central, recurring rhetorical device that Hegel returns to again and again throughout his philosophical system: that of describing the activity of reason and thought in terms of the dynamic activity and development of organic life.
Within this work, the category of life is conceived to be the absolute idea in the form of the subjective concept; an illustrative contrast may be seen in contrasting this with how the category of cognition is thought as being the absolute idea in the form of the judgement.
The speculative identity of mind and nature suggests that reason and history progress in the direction of the Absolute by traversing various stages of relative immaturity, just like a sapling or a child, overcoming necessary setbacks and obstacles along the way see Progress below.
The structure of Hegel's Logic appears to exhibit self-similarity , with sub-sections, in their treatment of more specific subject matter, resembling the treatment of the whole.
Hegel's concept of Aufhebung , by which parts are preserved and repurposed within the whole, anticipates the concept of emergence in contemporary systems theory and evolutionary biology.
However, Hegel himself describes the system as a "circle of circles:". Hegel's thinking can be understood as a constructive development within the broad tradition that includes Plato and Immanuel Kant.
To this list, one could add Proclus , Meister Eckhart , Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz , Plotinus , Jakob Böhme , and Jean-Jacques Rousseau.
What distinguishes them from materialists like Epicurus and Thomas Hobbes and from empiricists like David Hume , is that they regarded freedom or self-determination as real and having important ontological implications for soul or mind or divinity.
This focus on freedom is what generates Plato's notion in the Phaedo , Republic and Timaeus of the soul as having a higher or fuller kind of reality than that possessed by inanimate objects.
While Aristotle criticized Plato's "Forms", he preserved Plato's ontological implications for self-determination: ethical reasoning, the soul's pinnacle in the hierarchy of nature, the order of the cosmos and reasoned arguments for a prime mover.
Kant imported Plato's high esteem of individual sovereignty into his considerations of moral and noumenal freedom as well as of God. In his discussion of "Spirit" in his Encyclopedia , Hegel praises Aristotle's On the Soul as "by far the most admirable, perhaps even the sole, work of philosophical value on this topic".
Rather than simply rejecting Kant's dualism of freedom versus nature, Hegel aims to subsume it within "true infinity", the "Concept" or " Notion ": Begriff , "Spirit" and "ethical life" in such a way that the Kantian duality is rendered intelligible, rather than remaining a brute "given".
The reason why this subsumption takes place in a series of concepts is that Hegel's method in his Science of Logic and his Encyclopedia is to begin with basic concepts like "Being" and "Nothing" and to develop these through a long sequence of elaborations, including those already mentioned.
In this manner, a solution that is reached in principle in the account of "true infinity" in the Science of Logic' s chapter on "Quality" is repeated in new guises at later stages, all the way to "Spirit" and "ethical life" in the third volume of the Encyclopedia.
In this way, Hegel defended the truth in Kantian dualism against reductive or eliminative programs like materialism and empiricism.
Like Plato, with his dualism of soul versus bodily appetites, Kant pursued the mind's ability to question its felt inclinations or appetites and to come up with a standard of "duty" or, in Plato's case, "good" which transcends bodily restrictiveness.
Hegel preserved this essential Platonic and Kantian concern in the form of infinity going beyond the finite a process that Hegel in fact related to "freedom" and the "ought" ,  : —, the universal going beyond the particular in the Concept and Spirit going beyond Nature.
Hegel rendered these dualities intelligible by ultimately his argument in the "Quality" chapter of the "Science of Logic".
The finite has to become infinite in order to achieve reality. The idea of the absolute excludes multiplicity so the subjective and objective must achieve synthesis to become whole.
This is because, as Hegel suggested by his introduction of the concept of "reality",  : what determines itself—rather than depending on its relations to other things for its essential character—is more fully "real" following the Latin etymology of "real", more "thing-like" than what does not.
Finite things do not determine themselves because, as "finite" things, their essential character is determined by their boundaries over against other finite things, so in order to become "real" they must go beyond their finitude "finitude is only as a transcending of itself".
The result of this argument is that finite and infinite—particular and universal, nature and freedom—do not face one another as independent realities, but instead the latter, in each case, is the self-transcending of the former.
The mystical writings of Jakob Böhme had a strong effect on Hegel. This evolution was the result of God's desire for complete self-awareness.
Hegel was fascinated by the works of Kant, Rousseau and Johann Wolfgang Goethe and by the French Revolution. Modern philosophy, culture and society seemed to Hegel fraught with contradictions and tensions, such as those between the subject and object of knowledge, mind and nature, self and Other , freedom and authority, knowledge and faith, or the Enlightenment and Romanticism.
Hegel's main philosophical project was to take these contradictions and tensions and interpret them as part of a comprehensive, evolving, rational unity that in different contexts he called "the absolute Idea" Science of Logic , sections — or "absolute knowledge" Phenomenology of Spirit , " DD Absolute Knowledge".
According to Hegel, this unity evolved through and manifested itself in contradiction and negation. Contradiction and negation have the dynamic quality that every point in each domain of reality — consciousness , history, philosophy, art, nature and society—leads to further development until a rational unity is reached that preserves the contradictions as phases and sub-parts by lifting them up Aufhebung to a higher unity.
This mind comprehends all of these phases and sub-parts as steps in its own process of comprehension. It is rational because the same, underlying, logical , developmental order underlies every domain of reality and self-conscious rational thought, although only in the later stages of development does it come to full self-consciousness.
The rational, self-conscious whole is not a thing or being that lies outside of other existing things or minds.
Rather, it comes to completion in the philosophical comprehension of individual existing human minds who through their own understanding bring this developmental process to an understanding of itself.
Hegel's thought is revolutionary in that it is a philosophy of absolute negation—as long as absolute negation is at the center, systematization remains open, making it possible for human beings to become subjects.
In Hegel's draft manuscripts written during his time at the University of Jena, his notion of "Geist" was tightly bound to the notion of " Aether ", from which he also derived the concepts of space and time , but in his later works after Jena he did not explicitly use his old notion of "Aether".
Central to Hegel's conception of knowledge , mind, and reality was identity in difference ; mind externalizes itself in various forms and objects and stands outside or opposed to them and, through recognizing itself in them, is "with itself" in these external manifestations so that they are at one and the same time mind and other-than-mind.
This notion of identity in difference, which is bound up with his conception of contradiction and negativity, is a principal feature differentiating Hegel's thought from other philosophers.
Hegel distinguished between civil society and state in his Elements of the Philosophy of Right. On the left, it became the foundation for Karl Marx 's civil society as an economic base ;  to the right, it became a description for all non-state and the state is the peak of the objective spirit aspects of society, including culture, society and politics.
This liberal distinction between political society and civil society was used by Alexis de Tocqueville. While it appears that he felt that a civil society, such as the one in which he lived, was an inevitable step in the dialectic, he allowed for the crushing of other "lesser," not fully realized civil societies as they were not fully conscious of their lack of progress.
It was perfectly legitimate in Hegel's eyes for a conqueror, such as Napoleon, to come and destroy that which was not fully realized.
Hegel's State is the final culmination of the embodiment of freedom or right Rechte in the Elements of the Philosophy of Right. The State subsumes family and civil society and fulfills them.
All three together are called "ethical life" Sittlichkeit. The State involves three " moments ". In a Hegelian State, citizens both know their place and choose their place.
They both know their obligations and choose to fulfill them. An individual's "supreme duty is to be a member of the state" Elements of the Philosophy of Right , section The individual has "substantial freedom in the state".
The State is "objective spirit" so "it is only through being a member of the state that the individual himself has objectivity, truth, and ethical life" section Every member loves the State with genuine patriotism, but has transcended simple "team spirit" by reflectively endorsing their citizenship.
According to Hegel, " Heraclitus is the one who first declared the nature of the infinite and first grasped nature as in itself infinite, that is, its essence as process.
The origin of philosophy is to be dated from Heraclitus. His is the persistent Idea that is the same in all philosophers up to the present day, as it was the Idea of Plato and Aristotle".
According to Hegel, Heraclitus's "obscurity" comes from his being a true in Hegel's terms "speculative" philosopher who grasped the ultimate philosophical truth and therefore expressed himself in a way that goes beyond the abstract and limited nature of common sense and is difficult to grasp by those who operate within common sense.
Hegel asserted that, in Heraclitus, he had an antecedent for his logic: "[ Hegel cites a number of fragments of Heraclitus in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy.
Heraclitus did not form any abstract nouns from his ordinary use of "to be" and "to become" and seemed to oppose any identity A to any other identity B, C and so on, which is not-A.
However, Hegel interprets not-A as not existing at all, not nothing at all, which cannot be conceived, but an indeterminate or "pure" being without particularity or specificity.
For Hegel, the inner movement of reality is the process of God thinking as manifested in the evolution of the universe of nature and thought; Hegel argued that, when fully understood, reality is being thought by God as manifested in a person's comprehension of this process.
Since human thought is the image and fulfillment of God's thought, God can be understood by an analysis of thought and reality. Just as humans continually correct their concept of reality through a dialectical process , God becomes more fully manifested through the dialectical process of becoming.
For his god, Hegel does not take the logos of Heraclitus but refers to the nous of Anaxagoras , although he may well have regarded them the same as he continues to refer to god's plan, which is identical to God.
Whatever the nous thinks at any time is actual substance and is identical to limited being, but more remains in the substrate of non-being, which is identical to pure or unlimited thought.
The universe as becoming is a combination of being and non-being. The particular is never complete in itself, but in its quest to find completion continually transforms into more comprehensive, complex, self-relating particulars.
The essential nature of being-for-itself is that it is free "in itself;" it does not depend on anything else for its being.
The limitations represent fetters, which it must constantly cast off as it becomes freer and more self-determining.
Although Hegel began his philosophizing with commentary on the Christian religion and often expresses the view that he is a Christian, his ideas are not acceptable to some Christians even though he has had a major influence on 19th- and 20th-century theology.
As a graduate of a Protestant seminary, Hegel's theological concerns were reflected in many of his writings and lectures.
In his posthumously published Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion , Part 3 , Hegel is particularly interested in demonstrations of God's existence and the ontological proof.
This means that Jesus, as the Son of God, is posited by God over and against himself as other. Hegel sees relational and metaphysical unities between Jesus and God the Father.
To Hegel, Jesus is both divine and human. Hegel further attests that God as Jesus not only died, but "[ God rises again to life, and thus things are reversed".
The philosopher Walter Kaufmann argued that there was sharp criticism of traditional Christianity in Hegel's early theological writings. Kaufmann also pointed out that Hegel's references to God or to the divine and spirit drew on classical Greek as well as Christian connotations of the terms.
Aside to his beloved Greeks, Hegel saw before him the example of Spinoza and, in his own time, the poetry of Goethe, Schiller, and Hölderlin, who also liked to speak of gods and the divine.
So he, too, sometimes spoke of God and, more often, of the divine; and because he occasionally took pleasure in insisting that he was really closer to this or that Christian tradition than some of the theologians of his time, he has sometimes been understood to have been a Christian.
Hegel identified as an orthodox Lutheran and believed his philosophy was consistent with Christianity. Hegel conceived of the immortality of the soul in the following manner in reference to Christianity:  .
Thus the immortality of the soul must not be represented as first entering the sphere of reality only at a later stage; it is the actual present quality of spirit; spirit is eternal, and for this reason is already present.
Spirit, as possessed of freedom, does not belong to the sphere of things limited; it, as being what thinks and knows in an absolute way, has the universal for its object; this is eternity, which is not simply duration, as duration can be predicated of mountains, but knowledge.
J Inwood, Oxford: Clarendon Press, Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit, —8 , translated with an Introduction by Robert R.
Williams, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Translation of G. Hegel: Vorlesungen: Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte , vol.
Wood, translated by H. Nisbet, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, First published Volume 1: Manuscripts of the Introduction and the Lectures of —3 , edited and translated by Robert F.
Brown and Peter C. Hodgson with the assistance of William G. Geuss, Oxford: Oxford University Press, Knox, Oxford: Oxford University Press, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion , 3 Volumes, edited by Peter C.
Hodgson, translated by R. Brown, P. Hodgson, and J. M Stewart with the assistance of H. Harris, Oxford: Oxford University Press, —8.
Hegel: Vorlesungen: Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte , vols. Haldane and F. Simson, with introduction by F. Beiser, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, — Brown, translated by R.
Brown and J. Stewart with the assistance of H. Harris, Oxford: Oxford University Press, —9. Political Writings , ed. Laurence Dickey and H.
Nisbet, trans. B Nisbet, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Secondary Literature General Works and Anthologies Baur, Michael ed. Hegel: Key Concepts , Abingdon: Routledge.
Beiser, Frederick C. Bykova, Marina F. Westphal, , The Palgrave Hegel Handbook , London: Palgrave. Burbidge, John, , Historical Dictionary of Hegelian Philosophy , second edition, Lanham, Maryland: Scarecrow Press.
DeLaurentiis, Allegra and Jeffrey Edwards eds , , The Bloomsbury Companion to Hegel , London: Continuum Press.
Deligiorgi, Katerina, , Hegel: New Direction , Bucks, UK: Acumen. Houlgate, Stephen and Michael Baur eds , , A Companion to Hegel , Oxford: Blackwell.
Inwood, Michael. Jaeschke, Walter, , Hegel Handbuch: Leben-Werk-Schule , second edition, Stuttgart: Verlag J. Moyar, Dean, , The Oxford Handbook to Hegel , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Stern, Robert ed. Hegel: Critical Assessments , 4 volumes, London: Routledge. Taylor, Charles, , Hegel , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Life, Work, and Influence Althaus, Horst, , Hegel: An Intellectual Biography , translated by Michael Tarsh, Cambridge: Polity Press. Harris, H.
Livingston, London: Merlin Press. Moggach, Douglas ed. Pinkard, Terry, , Hegel: A Biography , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Toews, John, , Hegelianism: The Path toward Dialectical Humanism, — , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Forster, Michael N. Nichols, Jr.
McDowell, John. Abath, Cham: Springer. Pippin, Robert R. Pöggeler, Otto, , Hegels Idee einer Phänomenologies des Geistes , Freiburg: Karl Alber.
Stern, Robert, , Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Hegel and the Phenomenology of Spirit , London: Routledge. Westphal, Kenneth R. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Logic and Metaphysics Bowman, Brady, , Hegel and the Metaphysics of Absolute Negativity , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Brandom, Robert B. Brinkmann, Klaus, , Idealism without Limits: Hegel and the Problem of Objectivity. Dordrecht: Springer. Bristow, William F. Carlson, David Gray ed.
Hegel, The Science of Logic , translated by George di Giovanni, New York: Cambridge University Press. Fulda, Hans Friedrich, , Das Problem einer Einleitung in Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik , Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann.
Christopher Smith, New Haven: Yale University Press. MacIntyre ed. Hegel: A Collection of Critical Essays , New York: Anchor Books, — Hösle, Vittorio, , Hegels System: Der Idealismus der Subjectivität und das Problem der Intersubjectivität , 2 volumes, Hamburg: Meiner Verlag.
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IV, p. Vieillard-Baron, op. Hildesheim, Olms, , pp. Naissance de l'hypnose , PUF, Such is the march in which each term is denied, at the same time, integrated.
In this perspective, the negative plays, of course, essential. Negative moment and positive moment are two sides of the Hegelian dialectic.
The negative is the man who makes us understand. The man is, indeed, fundamentally, a desire denier: it tends toward a goal or object and it tries to assimilate, to deny them, as their own for example, food is absorbed by the subject.
Only shows Hegel, desire is the desire of my generator. Beyond the training of the individual self is in Work and into history as the negation is expressed with full power edifying.5/22/ · Hegel, the philosopher of the System. Hegel is a German philosopher who built a vast system ordering all knowledge of his time, after Kant‘s attempt to do it. Among his main works: The Phenomenology of Spirit (); Philosophical Propaedeutics () Science of Logic (). Plongez-vous dans l’idéalisme de Hegel avec inspa-senzokuike.com! Cette fiche philosophe de Dominique Coutant-Defer vous emmène à la rencontre de Hegel, l’un des plus éminents représentants de l’idéalisme au XIXe sièinspa-senzokuike.com biographie s’intéresse successivement à sa jeunesse marquée par le protestantisme, son activité de précepteur et ses premiers écrits, puis sa carrière.